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Abstract 
Web spamming techniques are used by spammers in order to boost one’s PageRank of the page and show 
themselves in top of the results. Spamming techniques can be classified as boosting techniques and hiding 
techniques. Search engines are facing problems mainly due to hiding techniques. Cloaking is a kind of hiding 
technique which is used to return different pages to the crawler and the user on their request to the cloaked web 
server. The cloaked web server always return same page to the user but it returns different pages to different 
crawlers because different search engines use different PageRanking techniques. Dynamic cloaking is a kind 
cloaking technique in which web servers intermittently send cloaked and non cloaked pages to crawler on its 
request. There is no method to detect dynamic cloaking to the best of our knowledge. This paper discusses 
various techniques that exist to detecting cloaking and an exhaustive comparison between the existing 
techniques is done. This paper also presents an abstract model to detect cloaking based on reputation. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of C3IT 
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1. Introduction 
 
Najork defined “Web spam refers to a host of techniques to subvert the ranking algorithms of web 
search engines and cause them to rank search results higher than they would otherwise”[2]. Cloaking 
is a kind of search engine spamming technique, in which different pages are sent to search engine 
bot and an ordinary browser on their request to cloaked web server. Even if two requests come from 
two different crawlers at the same time to the cloaked server, different pages are sent to the crawlers 
because different search engine uses different ranking algorithms. Z. Gyöngyi and H. Garcia-Molina 
[1] classified cloaking under hiding techniques because, it is hiding original high quality page from 
the user.  Google [7] defined cloaking as “Cloaking refers to the practice of presenting different 
content or URLs to users and search engines. Serving up different results based on user agent may 
cause your site to be perceived as deceptive and removed from the Google index”. Because of this 
cloaking the quality of search engine results are declining, since the cloaked server sends high 
PageRanked page to the crawler and spammed page to the user. So these pages are indexed in top of 
the results by search engines for user’s query. 
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There are three methods of cloaking which are used by cloakers, to issue different pages on 
crawler and browser request.  They are as follows: 
x IP address: Whenever a HTTP request comes to a cloaked site, it will check the list of IP 
addresses of the search engine crawlers. If there is a hit then it will send a high quality page 
to the crawler else it will send cloaked page. Now-a-days there are software’s or websites 
that are providing updated IP addresses of search engine crawlers, so that made the work of 
cloaker’s easy.    
x User-agent delivery: In this method the crawlers are identified by seeing the user-agent field 
of the HTTP request. The browser request and the crawler request are differentiated because 
they have different user-agent headers and crawler may fake this by placing some browser’s 
application. 
x Referer HTTP header: The referer header includes the IP address of the referrer of the 
request. So a cloaker can easily identify who is the referrer of the request. Like user-agent 
this header can also be faked. 
 
In this paper we present critical review on existing techniques and presented an abstract model to 
detect cloaking based on reputation of the URL. Reputation of a URL means assessing the 
trustworthiness of the URL based on various factors like age of the URL, whether the server is using 
dynamic IP or not, whether the company is in fortune 500 list or not, etc. We will collect top 200 two 
hundred URL’s of the most popular 100 queries of microsoft’s bing search engine. Classify each URL 
in one among the three categories based on the reputation given by the sites like cisco IronPort 
SenderBase Security Network [9]. By applying different technique to each URL based on its category, 
classify the URL whether it is cloaked or not. The contributions of the paper are:  
(a) It presents different existing techniques to detect cloaking and an exhaustive comparison 
between then is done, 
(b) Presented an abstract model to detect cloaking using reputation as a constraint, 
(c) The proposed technique reduces the computations by detecting cloaking at intermediate steps 
and reduces memory by using efficient data structures. 
 
Section 2 describes the existing techniques to detect cloaked web spam and exhaustive comparison 
is made among the existing techniques. Section 3 describes about dynamic cloaking, Section 4 
discusses a reputation based technique to detect cloaking. Section 5 discusses about the conclusion 
and future work to done.  
2. Detection techniques for cloaked web spam 
Cloaking detection techniques use difference in pages obtained between crawler and browser as 
major constraint. This section describes various techniques to detect syntactic and semantic cloaking.  
 
2.1 Identifying cloaked web servers: 
 
Najork[8] has proposed a technique to identify cloaked web servers in which  first object is 
collected by sending request to the web server by a crawler and second object is collected by sending 
request to the server from a ordinary browser. A Web server is identified as cloaked server if both 
the objects do not match. This method is used to detect cloaking by taking minimum number of 
copies but it falsely identify the non cloaked web servers also as cloaked web servers, because web 
is dynamic in nature there may be frequently updated sites 
 
2.2 Detecting cloaking using HITS and HOTS data: 
 
B. Wu and B. D. Davison [3] presented three methods to detect syntactic cloaking using two 
different datasets.  
x Term Difference: Three copies of URL named C1, B1 and C2 are collected. “Bag of words” 
of each copy of URL is collected, which means collecting all the terms that appeared in the 
page only once no matter how many times it appear in the page. Calculating the difference 
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in terms between both the crawler’s copies ( NCC) and calculating the difference in terms 
between browser’s  copy B1 and crawler’s copy C1 (NBC), a page is considered as a 
cloaking page if NBC>NCC exceeds a predetermined threshold value.  
x Link Difference: This method is similar to the previous method in which difference in links 
is considered. 
 
These two techniques do not provide satisfactory results because a high threshold improves 
precision at the expense of very low recall. They proposed a third method which automatically detects 
the cloaking using HOTS dataset. In that method they collected four copies of the page named C1, C2, 
B1 and B2.   
Algorithm to detect cloaking automatically: 
 
      In this method “bag of words” approach has been used. The difference between both the 
crawler’s copy (denoted as HCC) and browser’s copy (HBB) is calculated. If the sum of the terms 
that are present in both crawler’s copy but not in browser’s copy and  terms that are present in both 
the browser’s copy and not in crawler’s copy exceeds some threshold value then it is considered as 
cloaking. 
 
2.3 Cloaking score: 
 
Chellapilla and Chickering[5] proposed a method using the concept of normalized term 
frequency difference(NTFD). Two different query categories namely popularity and monetizability 
are used. Popularity of a query is defined to be proportional to the number of times it occurred in the 
query logs and monetizability as the amount of revenue generated by user clicks on sponsored links. 
In this method browser’s copy B1 and crawler’s copy C1 are collected, then both the copies are 
checked to find whether have same HTML or not, if so the URL is marked as non-cloaked, if not 
HTML is converted into simple text and verified whether both copies have same text, if so it is 
considered as legitimate URL, otherwise copy of browser B2 and crawler C2.are downloaded.  Then 
NTFD can be calculated  by using equation (1) : 
 
NTFD(T1,T2)=1-2(|T1  T2|/|T1T2|)      
 (1) 
 
Where |.| indicates the cardinality set operation, here the set is multiset of terms. The value of 
NTFD will always lies in [0,1]. Equation (2) gives the cloaking score S of a URL. 
 
S='D/'S         
 (2) 
 
Where 'D=min{NTFD(B1,C1),NTFD(C2,B2)}, and 'S=max{ NTFD(B1, B2),NTFD(C1,C2)}. If 
the value of S exceeds some threshold value then it is considered as cloaked. This method performed 
well for URLs retrieved from monetizable queries. Choosing a threshold value is not an easy task, 
since it can be in the interval [0,). 
 
2.4 Detecting semantic cloaking: 
       
 B. Wu and B. D. Davison introduced a technique to find semantic cloaking. Semantic 
cloaking refers to differences in meaning between pages which have the effect of deceiving search 
engine ranking algorithms [4]. This is a two step method in which the first step is filtering step and 
second step is classifying step. In first step the difference between crawler’s copy C1 and browser’s 
copy B1 is calculated. If TB1C1 is less than some threshold then it is considered as not-cloaked and 
filtered in this step. In classification step two more copies are downloaded each from crawler’s 
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perspective (C2) and browser’s perspective (B2). From the four copies B1, B2, C1 and C2 a set of 
features are extracted. The features extracted may of Content-based features or Link-based features 
from each copy. Based on these features a classifier is built and used to detect whether the page is 
semantically cloaked or not. Content-based features include features like response codes and number 
of terms in HTTP response header and few other attributes. Link-based features includes number of 
different kinds of links like total links, unique links etc. 
 
2.5 Tag-Based cloaking detection: 
 
Jun-Lin Lin[7] proposed three tag-based techniques to detect cloaking. Every URL copy is 
considered as a multiset of tags and standard set operations are performed. In this method tags are 
used to calculate the difference because the web is dynamic in nature, all the legitimate sites have 
similar kind of structure even if the content is changed, but a cloaked URL presents different 
structure to both the crawler and the browser. Here the tag difference between two multisets S1 and 
S2 is shown in (3): 
|(S1\S2)(S2\S1)|= |(S1S2)|-|( S1 S2)|          
   (3) 
 
Author defined three formulas and named them as TagDiff2, TagDIff3 and TagDiff4. The difference 
between the tag’s of browser’s copy and crawler’s copy of a URL are calculated as follows: 
 
TagDiff2:  |B1\C1||C1\B1|                         
   (4) 
TagDiff3:  (|B1\C1||C1\B1|)-(|C1\C2||C2\C1|)                 
   (5) 
TagDiff4:  |(B1B2)\(C1C2)|+|(C1C2)\(BB1)|          
   (6) 
 
Equations (4), (5) and (6) are used to calculate the tag difference between browser’s copy and 
crawler’s copy. Here B1B2, C1and C2 are taken as multisets of tags of browser’s and crawler’ 
copies of the URL.  If difference exceeds some threshold then it is marked cloaked URL. The 
number after TagDiff indicates the number of copies of the URL. The body spammed page can also 
be marked as legitimate site if it considers only tag structure. 
 
Comparison of detection techniques: 
 
The comparison between cloaking detection techniques are based on number of copies of 
URL needed, how the data elements are used i.e. whether a URL copy is considered as set or 
multiset and drawback of each method. Table 1 gives the comparison between various cloaking 
detection techniques.  
Table 1. Comparison among cloaking detection techniques 
Method Copy Group Drawback
Identifying cloaked web 
servers(Najork)
2 Feature vectors Identifies dynamic page also as cloaked  
Link Difference 4 Set Only fewer cloaking pages can found because 
link difference is smaller. 
Term Difference 4 Set Term and link difference falsely identifies 
dynamic pages as cloaked and they need more 
number of copies.  
Algorithm to detect automatically 4 Set Falsely identifies dynamic pages as cloaked 
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3. Dynamic cloaking: 
 
Jun-Lin Lin defined dynamic cloaking as “the practice of cloaking intermittently to make it 
difficult to identify”[6]. Dynamic cloaker can switch between “Cloak” and “No Cloak” modes. In 
“Cloak” it will send keyword enriched page to the crawler, in “No Cloak” mode cloaker will send 
same version to both crawler and browser.  
3.1 Event driven cloaking: 
In this method the switching between the modes is done based on crawler event.  Here crawler 
event indicates the request from the crawler. A timer is maintained to note the last crawler event. 
x Initially mode is set to the “Cloak”.  
x When a crawler event occurs i.e. when a crawler sends a request, it will check its mode. If it 
“Cloak” mode it will send different copies to crawler and browser and it will switch itself to 
the “No Cloak” mode. 
x When a time up event occur the cloaker switches to “Cloak” mode, generally time up event 
will occur if timer exceeds some predefined threshold of last crawler event.  
3.2 Monitor table: 
This method uses monitor table to store the IP addresses of the crawlers which sends the request 
and the time of the most recent visit of the crawler. When a crawler event occurs it will check 
whether the IP address of that crawler is in table or not, if it’s not present then it is appended to the 
table with the current time and replies the crawler with the high PageRanked page. If the IP address 
of the crawler is already there then it replies the crawler with non spammed version and it updates 
the time of that crawler entry with the current time. A time up event occurs if an entry exceeds a 
predefined threshold.  
 
4. A reputation based technique to detect cloaking 
 
The implementation flow of the proposed technique is given in fig 1. Initially download crawler’s 
copy (C1) and browser’s copy (B1) of each URL and simple text comparison is made between the 
copies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cloaking Score 4 Multiset Choosing threshold for S is not an easy task [7]. 
Detecting semantic cloaking 4 Set+Multiset It needs 4 copies if initial step is not satisfied. 
TagDiff2 2 Multiset Fails in the case, if structure of the page is 
changed. 
TagDiff3 3 Multiset Fails in the case, if structure of the page is 
changed. 
TagDiff4 4 Multiset Fails in the case, if structure of the page is 
changed. 
Equal 
Collect the dataset
Collect crawler’s copy (C1), Browser’s 
copy (B1) 
Legitimate site 
Text 
comparison of 
C1, B1
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Figure 1: Flowchart of implementation 
If they are equal we will declare the page as legitimate page. If they are not equal then classify the 
URL’s into one of the three categories named: good, poor and moderate. Apply cloaking detecting 
technique starting with pages having high reputation, because of this the pages having poor 
reputation like spammed pages will never appear in top of the search results. If the URL is a 
classified under: 
x Good: Download another copy of the crawler’s copy (C2) and calculate the difference 
between C1, C2 as NCC and difference between C1, B1 as NCB. If NBC exceeds NCC by 
some defined threshold (as per experimental results) then classify the URL as cloaked 
otherwise as legitimate. 
x Moderate: Download another copy of the crawler’s copy (C2) and browser’s copy (B2) and 
calculate the difference as shown in (6) for words. If the difference exceeds some defined 
threshold (as per experimental results) then classify the URL as cloaked. 
x Poor:  Download another copy of the crawler’s copy (C2) and browser’s copy (B2). Sort the 
words in pages according to some predefined order. Now calculate the difference by using 
Equation (6) for each word in decreasing order of their frequencies. If the difference exceeds 
some predefined threshold value then stop at that instance and declare the page as cloaked. 
The sorting of the words plays a vital role because the pages with less reputation has high 
possibility of body spam, redirections, etc. so the difference between the pages sent to the 
crawler and browser will be more. So they can be identified at intermediate step itself. We 
will use some efficient data structures to maintain the words according to their frequencies. 
Not Equal 
Yes
No 
No 
Download the Crawler’s 
copy (C2) 
Download the Crawler’s copy 
(C2), Browser’s copy (B2) 
Download the Crawler’s copy (C2), 
Browser’s copy (B2)
Sort the words in alphabetical 
order 
Calculate the term difference       Calculate the difference 
between (C1,C2) and (C1,B1) 
Use automatic algorithm to calculate the 
difference 
If type= 
moderate 
If 
type=poor
Legitimate 
 site 
Cloaked Site        
Legitimate Site       
If diff > 
thrsh 
If diff > 
thrsh 
If diff > 
thrsh 
No No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Find the type of URL
Yes 
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So this technique treats each URL differently based on its reputation. If the URL is having high 
reputation then there is less possibility of cloaking so simply technique is applied. If the URL is 
having poor reputation there is high possibility of cloaking so we use four copies to detect cloaking 
using equation (6) on sorted list of words. By evaluating the URL’s from high reputation to poor 
reputation and displaying the results according to evaluation order, the false positives will also never 
occur in top of the search results. By this way cloaked pages that are not detected by the technique 
will also never appear in top of the results. 
5. Conclusions and future work 
 
This paper proposed a reputation based technique to detect static cloaking, since static cloaking is 
most common form of cloaking, it is causing severe threat to the search engines. This method has to 
be practically implemented by collecting large dataset and finding reputation of each URL. The 
method proposed in this paper uses reputation of the URL to apply appropriate technique on the 
URL to find cloaking. Most of the techniques have inherent disadvantage of downloading more 
number of copies and high computations. The proposed technique will reduce the number of 
computations by detecting at intermediate steps and maintaining the data of the page using efficient 
data structures.  
 
This paper also presented an exhaustive comparison of existing techniques based on the attributes: 
number of copies used, group that was used by the method and the drawback of each method. This 
technique should be examined on real life data set to validate the technique. The technique should be 
further extended to detect dynamic cloaking to make search engines results free from cloaking.  
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